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1. Introduction 
Formalizing land rights in most of the developing world has been advanced as a way of 
ensuring tenure security for landholders. Such rights could confer particular advantages 
to women in terms of increasing their status as farmers both within the household and 
in the community (e.g., Gebru, 2011; Lastaria-Cornhiel et al., 2003). However, 
formalized land rights may largely take a patrilineal shape, with poor and vulnerable 
household groups, particularly women, losing out in the process (Plateau, 2000; Besley 
and Burgess, 2000; Deininger et al., 2003).  
In light of this, donor and implementing development agencies, which have been 
supporting efforts to formalize land rights since the 1980s, adopted the view that 
explicit recognition of women’s rights and their active participation in designing and 
implementing land policy had to become integral features of future designs (USAID, 
2010; Lastaria-Cornhiel, 2005). The Ethiopian land certification program could be 
considered such an attempt to explicitly incorporate women’s land rights. The 
program’s emphasis on gender equity is highlighted by the issuance of certificates in 
the name of both spouses, and inclusion of at least one female member in the local land 
administration committees (Deininger et al., 2008a). 
Features of the land certification program have been previously assessed in 
relation to several economic variables of interest (e.g., Holden et al., 2009; Deininger 
et al., 2011). Among studies that focus on female-headed households, Holden et al. 
(2011) show that the land certification program in the Tigray Region in Ethiopia 
enhanced their participation in the land rental market. In addition, Holden and Ghebru 
(2013) find a significant positive effect of certification on food security and nutrition 
of female-headed households. However, these previous studies do not extend to 
analyzing the productivity-enhancing effects of the program for women, crucially 
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through direct impacts of increased tenure security and through the efficiency-
enhancing effects of land markets. Indeed, as pointed out by Deininger et al. (2011), 
analyzing the effect of land certification on the productivity of female farmers may 
contribute to important insights about the impacts of the program. Accordingly, the 
major contribution of this paper is that we address the gaps in these studies by explicitly 
assessing features of the Ethiopian land certification program with respect to the 
productivity of female-headed households in the Amhara region.  
From the perspective of the broader literature, the role of tenure security in 
enhancing investment and improving the allocative efficiency of the land market, and 
thus increasing land productivity, is well established1. Based on this, the central premise 
of our paper is that gains in tenure security, particularly through the land rental market, 
are expected to enhance the productivity of the land owned by women. In this respect, 
the novel contribution of this study is to extend the literature on the relationships 
between enhanced tenure security and improved land rental markets to quantify the 
gains in productivity of land owned by women2. The conceptual framework in the next 
section presents the mechanisms by which underlying tenure insecurity plays a role in 
determining the performance of land productivity owned by women. Specifically it 
discusses how enhanced tenure security, through the certification program, could 
translate into gains in productivity, by focusing on female-headed households in 
Ethiopia.  
In section 2, a literature review and general hypotheses of the paper are 
presented. Section 3 gives a brief background on Ethiopian land policy, women’s land 
rights, and the certification program. The survey strategy and data are discussed in 
section 4, while the estimation methodology is provided in section 5. Section 6 presents 
the empirical findings and section 7 concludes. 
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2. The certification program, participation in the land rental market, and the 
productivity of female-owned land: a conceptual framework  
Tenure insecurity of female-headed households might stem from formal barriers 
associated with limited land access though land allocation by communities and 
inheritance from families (Kevane and Gray, 1999; Agarwal, 1994). It might also 
source from informal barriers, where women’s ability to exercise their rights may be 
limited by lack of effective control over the land, lack of legal knowledge, customary 
laws overruling constitutional rights, weak implementation of laws, lack of physical 
capacity and financial problems (Deininger et al., 2008b; Teklu, 2005; Quisumbing and 
Pandolefelli, 2010; Lastarria-Cornhiel et al., 2003; Dey, 1981; Yngstrom; 2002). Taken 
together, women’s weak position as land holders makes them inherently more tenure 
insecure than their male counterparts.  
The land certification program in Ethiopia is primarily expected to increase 
tenure security for all households. Given that women’s pre-program tenure security was 
lower, we may expect a larger increase in tenure security for female-headed households. 
The major hypothesis of this paper is that increased tenure security, through land 
certification, contributes to increased productivity of female-owned farms.  Such farms 
are usually comprised of several plots, some of which are rented out, while the rest are 
owner-operated. The mechanisms by which productivity can be enhanced for both 
rented out and owner-operated portions of farms owned by female-headed households 
are associated with some key features of female-headed households in Ethiopia, which 
we discuss below. 
Female-headed households in rural Ethiopia are characterized by lack of assets 
(including animal draught power) as well as labour shortages (Holden and Bezabih, 
2008; Gebru, 2011). The lack of productive labour is largely attributed to taboos against 
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women undertaking major farming activities, such as ploughing with oxen (Gebru, 
2011; Bashaw, 2005)3. Such prohibitions in Ethiopia contrast with the active 
participation of women in farming in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, where female 
members of the household (especially wives) farm and manage separate plots (e.g., 
Udry, 1996).  
Without such complementary non-land factors of production, female-headed 
households are left to either heavily rely on the land rental market for production and/or 
to manage their land less than efficiently (Holden and Bezabih, 2008). In addition, the 
fact that the main agricultural activities are undertaken only by men might lead to 
tendencies to disregard the role of women as proper farmers (Mutimba and Bekele, 
2002), undermining women’s positions as farmers and landowners4.  In line with this, 
compared to plots owned by male-headed households, productivity is shown to be lower 
on plots owned by female-headed households, both rented out and owner-operated 
(Holden and Bezabih, 2008; Bashaw, 2005; and Yigremew, 2001). 
Land rentals may also be sub-optimal for female-headed households, through 
choices of tenants and enforcement of the terms of rentals.  In many instances, female-
headed households are persuaded to rent out land to tenants of low productivity or to 
relatives and in-laws5. Such tenants may feel entitled to prioritise working on their own 
plots and therefore under-provide effort on land rented from female landlords. This in 
turn implies that female-owned plots that are rented out may be sub-optimally managed, 
particularly during peak labour and oxen seasons (days), when tenants are labour 
constrained (Holden and Bezabih, 2008). In addition, female-headed households may 
engage in frequent tenant turnovers, for fear that keeping a tenant for too long on an 
insecure holding might weaken their tenure relative to a claim the tenant might assert; 
as a result, the female-headed household might forgo the gains from longer-term land 
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rentals6. Similarly, owner-operated plots may also be managed sub-optimally, given the 
constraints to labour and oxen we discussed above.  
Accordingly, we hypothesize that the gains in tenure security for women as a 
result of the program translate into improvement in land market participation and 
greater productivity for farms owned by female-headed households. Further, by 
ensuring women’s participation in the land rental market in a fairer manner, the 
proportion of land rented out will be increased to an optimal level, such that efficiency 
in the management of the non-leased portion of their land will also increase. In sum, 
the land certification program has the potential to increase productivity on both rented 
out and owner-operated land of female-headed households.  
It should be noted that we focus on the comparison of female- versus male-
headed households as opposed to male and female plot owners within the household. 
This is because our survey data lacks detailed information on actual labour and 
managerial inputs for each individual plot within a farm, making meaningful 
comparison impossible.   
Nonetheless, there are several merits to separately looking into inter-household 
gender-based differentials in productivity. First, female-headed households are 
increasingly significant as a category of households,7 which makes comparisons 
between male- and female-headed households important. Second, such inter-household 
comparisons enable us see the benefits of increased tenure security through better 
resource allocation at a household level, which might not be captured in intra-household 
comparisons unless there is detailed information on the bargaining dynamics between 
genders and resource allocation within a household. One key benefit of enhanced tenure 
security that intra-household comparisons may not capture is land market participation, 
which is a decision made at a household level and which might not be captured by the 
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observed gains in male/female operated plots within the household. Further, both the 
significant emphasis on land rental markets and the smaller emphasis on labour 
contribution are also well-suited to the Ethiopian agricultural setting and the constraints 
women face.  
3. Ethiopian Land Policy, the Evolution of Women’s Land Rights, and the Land 
Certification Program 
Rural women in Ethiopia have historically held an inferior position in relation to men 
in terms of property rights. Under Ethiopia’s feudalistic land tenure system, women did 
not own land independently, but only had access to land (use rights) as wives and as 
daughters (Crummy, 2000). The land reform proclamation of February 1975 that 
followed the overthrow of the feudalist government by a military government (the 
Derg) was marked by nationalizing of all rural land and granting of usufruct rights to 
farmers (Kebede, 2008). Per the 1975 legislation, spouses enjoyed joint ownership of 
the land, implying that, on paper, men and women were entitled to the same land rights. 
However, women’s rights to land depended on marriage and were, in most cases, not 
registered separately (Crewett et al., 2008). 
The EPRDF8-led government that overthrew the Derg in 1991 largely 
maintained the land policy of its predecessor, keeping all rural and urban land under 
state ownership (Gebreselassie, 2006). Significant changes included formal 
confirmation that land rights are to be granted to men and women, including the right 
to lease out land, albeit with restrictions on the share of land and limits on the lease 
period (Crewett et al., 2008). 
Such provisions enabled women to claim land directly from the village level 
distribution for the last 20 years or so (Teklu, 2005). For married women, marital land 
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tends to be her access to land, as a woman is expected to move to her husband’s home 
after marriage. Oxen or cattle tend to be the property contributed by the women, while 
men mainly contribute land and a house. The head of the household manages most 
assets brought to marriage (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2005).  
Stemming from this, upon divorce, the customary law indicates a woman shares 
all property she owned during marriage except for the land and the house (Fafchamps 
and Quisumbing, 2005). Further, women’s claim over land could be affected because 
of lack of implementation of constitutional laws, biases from male-dominated 
institutional services, and customary laws overruling the constitutional right of women 
(Gebru, 2011; Teklu, 2005).  In addition, most divorced women tend to be persuaded 
by arbitrators to enter into a sharecropping arrangement with the ex-husband 
(Fafchamps and Quisumbing,  2005)9. 
The Ethiopian certification program was initiated in response to widespread 
concerns over land tenure insecurity associated with state land ownership. The program 
follows the Federal Rural Land Administration Proclamation of 1997, revised in 2005, 
and has been implemented in the four most populous regions of the country: Tigray, 
Amhara, Oromiya, and the Southern Nations and Nationalities (SNNR) (Adenew and 
Abdi, 2005). 
 The focus of the empirical analysis in this paper is on the Amhara National 
Regional State (ANRS), in which the program commenced in 2004. The overarching 
responsibility for implementation of the land registration process and the development 
of a Land Administration System in the Amhara Region lies within the Environmental 
Protection, Land Administration & Use Authority (EPLAUA) (Adinew and Dadi, 
2005). The process of land registration starts with an awareness meeting between the 
woreda and kebele10 administration and farmers about the purpose and organization of 
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land registration and certification (Palm, 2010). The discussions are followed by the 
election of Land Administration and Use Committees (LACs), along with provision of 
training for the elected LAC members. This is a local consultation process in which 
most of the input for adjudication and demarcation of land is provided by the local 
community (Adinew and Dadi, 2005). The neighbourhood farm households, jointly 
with LAC members, walk the farm fields in order to identify the individual household 
plots and plot borders, with neighbours as witnesses, prior to entering this information 
into forms. Responsibility for approving the legal status of the holding is held by the 
woreda EPLAUA head together with the LAC chairperson. The actual evidence of 
registration is issued in two stages: temporary paper evidence, followed by the Book of 
Holdings (Olsson and Magnérus, 2007). 
4. Survey strategy and data 
The data used for the empirical analysis is taken from the Sustainable Land 
Management Survey, conducted in the 14 kebeles and five different woredas selected 
from the zones of East Gojjam and South Wollo of the Amhara National Regional State 
in 2005 and 200711. Each of the survey rounds consists of 1,500 randomly selected 
households and over 7,500 plots. About half of the sampled kebeles in each zone 
received certification at least 14 months before the beginning of the survey in 2007.   
4.1. The choice of control and treatment kebeles and construction of the certification 
variable  
As discussed in section 3, the certification program was designed with the intention that 
all woredas (and kebeles) within the region would be reached simultaneously. However, 
due to shortages in financial and manpower resources at both kebele and woreda levels, 
a campaign style gradual roll-out was adopted. The process was typically initiated in 
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the slack agricultural seasons owing to the availability of the famers for interviews and 
the conduciveness of the dry-weather roads for field work by the officials. The officials 
prepared and completed the certificates for distribution during the peak agricultural 
season. The discontinuity created by agricultural seasonality and road conditions along 
with the campaign-style roll-out creates a time gap in the implementation in the 
different woredas. Accordingly, the kebeles, and households within kebeles in which 
the program was implemented at least 14 months prior to the survey in 2007, are taken 
as the treatment group and the rest of the kebeles in our sample as the comparison 
group12. 
Because our analysis focuses on certification and female-headed households, 
we present descriptive statistics for the key variables by gender of the household head 
and certification status of the kebele, respectively.13 One key issue in the descriptive 
statistics is the significant difference between treatment and control kebeles with 
respect to land size, plot fertility, and oxen and livestock ownership. Such observable 
biases rule out direct comparison between treatment and control groups to identify the 
impact of certification. However, the mechanisms that enable identification of the 
impact of the program on productivity under such circumstances are discussed in 
Section 5.  
4.3. Characteristics of Female-headed Households and Land Market Participation  
As can be seen in Table 1, 16 percent of our sample households have a female head14. 
Of these, 87 percent have a head of household who is illiterate. The corresponding share 
of male-headed households is 49 percent. Female-headed households, further, have less 
access to male labour, have smaller landholdings and own substantially less livestock 
and oxen than do male-headed households. However, there does not seem to be gender-
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based discrepancy in terms of soil fertility or plot slope. About 20 percent of the 
households have experienced land-related conflict, while about seven percent have 
experienced land loss (mainly through redistribution and at times through settlement of 
conflict). With respect to perceived tenure, about 22 percent of male-headed households 
expect an increase in future holdings, compared to a slightly lower percentage (19%) 
for female-headed households. Similarly, the percentage of male-headed households 
who expect a decrease in their holdings is about 31 percent, compared to 35 percent of 
female-headed households who expect a decrease in holdings.15 
<<Table 1 about here>> 
About 10 percent of the surveyed households engage in renting out land. Of these, 93 
percent are sharecropped and 7 percent rented under fixed rent contracts16.   Among 
households renting out land, female-headed and households with illiterate heads are 
overrepresented (among households with female heads, 32 percent rent out part of their 
land). Households that rent out land are further characterized by having fewer male 
adults in the household and owning less oxen and livestock. Finally, land rented out is 
characterized by lower fertility than owner-operated land. Because females to some 
extent are prevented from farming the land, and because households with fewer male 
adults and oxen have limited ability to farm their land effectively, we may thus expect 
that these households have incentives to rent out land to less resource-constrained 
households. 
<<Table 2 about here>> 
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5.  Empirical Approach and Estimation Methodology  
Accurate identification of the impact of a project would require that participants and 
nonparticipants have the same ex-ante chance of participating in the program. This 
implies that observed or unobserved attributes prior to the introduction of the program 
have no impact on the likelihood of actual participation. Ideally, treated and control 
groups would be identical in every respect other than the intervention itself and 
quantifying the project impact would only require computing the difference between 
the average of the outcome variable in the treatment and control groups. However, as 
such instances are rare in real-world settings, a study evaluating impact must address 
selection bias stemming from inadequate controls for observable heterogeneity plus 
bias stemming from unobservable factors (Ravallion, 2007).  
Accordingly, three sources of potential bias could be addressed using the 
following three methods. The propensity score matching method enables controlling 
for observed biases, such as the difference in the characteristics of certified and non-
certified households that we noted in our data. The unobservable biases associated with 
confounding factors that are not observed in the data are accounted for by the 
difference-in-difference method. In addition, the common trend assumption tests are 
used to test for the presence of trend-based unobservables. The formulations of the 
propensity score matching and test of common trends assumptions, along with the 
corresponding estimation results, are presented in Appendix B. 
 
5.1. The Difference-in-Difference approach 
This approach compares the change in land productivity of certified kebeles (treatment 
group) with the corresponding change in non-certified kebeles (control group). By 
accounting for both observed and unobserved differences between the control and 
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treatment groups (Wooldridge, 2002), the difference-in-difference method captures the 
causal effect of the program on plot-level productivity.  
5.1.1 Productivity Analysis with Certification 
Our econometric analysis of the impact of certification starts with assessing the 
relationships between certification and productivity on all the plots in the survey. 
Accordingly, the plot-level pooled productivity equation is given by: 
ln(𝑦𝑝𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛿𝜏𝑡 + 𝜗𝑐𝑣 + 𝜙𝜏𝑡𝑐𝑣 + 𝛾𝑔𝑖 + 𝜃𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑣𝜏 +𝜛𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇𝑋𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖
+ 𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 
(1)  
where, for kebele v, household i, plot p, and year t, ln⁡(𝑦𝑝𝑖𝑡)⁡is the log of the value of 
output per hectare;⁡𝜏𝑡is a year dummy for 2007 (after certification); and 𝑐𝑣 is a dummy 
variable identifying whether the plot is located in a treatment or control village. The 
coefficient on the interaction variable⁡𝜏𝑡𝑐𝑣 thus corresponds to the effect of certification. 
We will henceforth refer to this variable as post-treatment. While 𝑔𝑖𝑡 represents the 
gender (female-headed household) dummy, 𝑆𝑖𝑡 represents observable socioeconomic 
characteristics, excluding gender, and 𝑋𝑝𝑖𝑡 is a vector of observable physical plot 
characteristics. Finally, 𝑤𝑖⁡represents unobservable time-invariant household 
characteristics and 𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡⁡denotes the remainder disturbance that can vary over time as 
well as across households. In order to analyze the specific impacts of certification on 
our group of interest, female-headed households, and the relationship between 
certification and participation in the land market, we also run separate regressions for 
plots owned by female-headed households and rented out plots. 
 Because it may be presumed that the observed covariates are correlated with the 
unobserved individual effects, and because we want to keep time-invariant variables 
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such as gender visible, our estimation procedure involves the pseudo-fixed effects 
estimation approach (Wooldridge, 2002). The approach involves explicitly modeling 
the relationship between time-varying regressors and the unobservable effect in an 
auxiliary regression (Mundlak, 1978). In particular, 𝑤𝑖⁡can be approximated by its 
linear projection onto the observed explanatory variables: 
𝑤𝑖 = 𝜔𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝑟𝑖          (3) 
where 𝑟𝑖 represents the random error term and 𝑍𝑖𝑡⁡⁡is a vector of all the time-varying 
regressors in equation (2). Averaging over t for a given observational unit i and 
substituting the resulting expression into equation (1) gives: 
ln(𝑦𝑝𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛿𝜏𝑡 + 𝜗𝑐𝑣 +𝜙𝜏𝑡𝑐𝑣 + 𝛾𝑔𝑖 + 𝜃𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑣𝜏 + 𝜛𝑆𝑖𝑡+𝜇𝑋𝑝𝑖𝑡 +𝜔?̅?𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑡      (4) 
where⁡𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑡 = 𝑟𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡.  
5.1.2 Analysis of the impact of certification on rented out and owner-
operated plots 
The decision to rent out a portion of all the plots held by the household and to operate 
on the rest of the plots is likely to be non-random if rented out plots have systematically 
different characteristics from self-managed plots. In particular, unobserved variables 
may influence both the decision to rent out and productivity, resulting in inconsistent 
estimates of the effect on productivity of renting out. In such instances, an appropriate 
model of analysis is the endogenous switching regression model (Maddala, 1983), a 
system of equations consisting of the rent-out equation and productivity regimes for the 
rented out and owner-operated categories.  
 Because our estimation deals with selection bias and unobserved heterogeneity 
simultaneously, individual additive effects of both sources of estimation bias may be 
correlated with each other. Accordingly, Wooldridge (1995), as well as Dustmann and 
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Rochina-Barrachina (2007), suggest obtaining inverse Mill’s ratios for each time period 
in the selection equation and using the resulting inverse Mill’s ratios in the succeeding 
productivity equations. 
Equation (4) represents the plot selection, while equations (5) and (6) represent 
owner-operated and rented out plots. In order to ensure identification of the decision to 
rent out land, in addition to the set of standard control variables, two variables that are 
not included in the productivity regressions are included: experience of past land-
related conflict and experience of losses in land holdings, as represented by 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 
and 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 in equation (4) below17. 
The decision to rent out a plot as represented by equation (5):  
 𝐿𝑝𝑖𝑡
= {
1⁡𝑖𝑓⁡𝛼 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛿𝜏𝑡 + 𝜗𝑐𝑣 + 𝜙𝜏𝑡𝑐𝑣 + 𝛾𝑔𝑖 + 𝜃𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑣 +𝜛𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜚𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑡 + 𝜍𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + 𝜇𝑋𝑝𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽?̅?𝑖𝑡 +𝜔?̅?𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑡 > 0
0⁡𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡⁡
 
(1)  
where⁡𝐿𝑝𝑖𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the plot is leased out and zero otherwise. 
A similar specification as (3) applies to owner-operated and rented out plots, as given 
in equations (6) and (7), respectively:  
 ln (𝑦𝑝𝑖𝑡)
𝑁
= 𝛼+ 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛿𝜏𝑡 + 𝜗𝑐𝑣 +𝜙𝜏𝑡𝑐𝑣 + 𝛾𝑔𝑖 + 𝜃𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑣 +𝜛𝑆𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑋𝑝𝑖𝑡 +𝜙𝑖𝑚𝑟𝑖𝑡 +𝜔?̅?𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑡 
  
(6) 
 ln (𝑦𝑝𝑖𝑡)
𝑅
= 𝛼+ 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛿𝜏𝑡 + 𝜗𝑐𝑣 +𝜙𝜏𝑡𝑐𝑣 + 𝛾𝑔𝑖 + 𝜃𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑣 +𝜛𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇?̃?𝑝𝑖𝑡
+𝜙𝑖𝑚𝑟𝑖𝑡 +𝜔?̅?𝑖𝑡 + 𝑣𝑝𝑖𝑡 
(7) 
where the superscripts N and R represent owner-operated and rented-out plots, 
respectively. The variable imr stands for the inverse Mill’s ratio from the plot rent 
equation.  
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6. Results and Discussion  
In this section, we present the results of our empirical analysis. We start with an analysis 
of the impact of certification on productivity, on the whole sample and on a female-
headed household-only sample. We then proceed with an analysis of the effect of 
certification on the choice to rent out plots and the conditional effect on productivity. 
In the main text, we present the results of our estimations. Results in elasticity form are 
available in Appendix C.  
6.2 Determinants of productivity: the impact of certification 
Table 3 presents the estimation results of the difference-in-difference analysis which 
considers the effects on productivity on i) all plots in the pooled sample, ii) rented-out 
plots and iii) female-owned plots. As can be seen in Table 3, our empirical analysis 
suggests that treated kebeles have significantly higher productivity, ceteris paribus. Our 
estimations further produce a significant coefficient on the post-treatment variable in 
the regression based on the female-headed household sample, and on the interaction 
variable between post-treatment and female head in the pooled sample. These results 
suggest that land certification had a positive and significant effect on productivity, and 
that the effect is relatively robust. In addition, our results suggest that the effect of 
certification is positive and significantly stronger for female-headed households. In 
other words, land certification seems be associated with a significant increase in 
productivity in general and on farms belonging to female heads in particular18.  
 The effect of certification on productivity on rented out plots is insignificant, 
although we find that rented out plots have significantly higher productivity, thus 
suggesting that the rental market may contribute to greater efficiency. This lack of effect 
on productivity on rented out plots is interesting, since the increase in tenure security 
derived from land certification is expected to enhance the functioning of land rental 
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markets, leading to gains in increased efficiency. How these gains in efficiency actually 
turn into overall farm-level productivity and specifically into productivity on own-
managed plots is explored further in section 6.3.  
<< Table 3 about here >> 
Regarding the results for the remaining covariates, plots belonging to female-
headed households display consistently and significantly lower productivity than plots 
belonging to households with male heads. This is in line with previous findings (see 
section 1). We further find a significant and negative effect of the age of the household 
head on plot productivity. This effect is, however, very small and not present if we 
restrict our sample to plots belonging to female-headed households. The differences in 
results between the pooled and female-headed sample, and particularly the 
insignificance in the latter, may be the consequence of a smaller sample size. It is worth 
noting that size and sign of the coefficients may be the consequence of a non-linear 
relationship between age of household head and productivity. We may, for example, 
expect that very young and very old household heads have less control and make poorer 
production-related decisions. If this is the case, the relation between age and 
productivity corresponds to an “inverted U” rather than a straight line.  
Turning to total landholdings, we find that larger farm size is associated with lower 
productivity per hectare, and that the effect is relatively large. This result may be caused 
by, e.g., a correlation between the size of the landholdings and soil fertility, and/or a 
higher intensity in the use of productivity inputs on smaller plots (Carter, 1984). The 
relatively large negative effect may thus point to low input intensity and constraints to 
input use. The number of livestock, measured in tropical livestock units and commonly 
used as a measure of wealth, is a positive and significant determinant of productivity. 
This is in line with the expectation that wealthier households have better physical and 
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human resources that complement land productivity. The results also show that the 
number of oxen present on the farm is a significant determinant of plot productivity. 
This is indicative of the crucial role of oxen as a source of draught power. It is also in 
line with the anecdotal evidence regarding the overall scarcity of this resource, given 
the considerable cost of acquiring a pair of oxen. 
However, we also find that very few of the soil characteristics available in the 
dataset have an impact on productivity. We have information on soil colour (red, black 
and other colour), plot slope (flat, medium steep and steep) and a measure of fertility 
(fertile, medium fertile and non-fertile soil) as reported by the respondent. As expected, 
our results suggest a positive correlation between fertile (lem) soil and productivity, but 
the effect is relatively small and only significant at the 10 percent level. None of the 
other soil characteristics display a significant correlation with plot productivity. 
Finally, we find no significant correlation between tenant characteristics and plot 
productivity. We have information regarding the age of the tenant, the number of oxen 
owned and whether the tenant owns land in addition to the land that he rents from the 
landlord.  
6.3. The impact of certification on the decision to rent out land and the productivity of 
owner-operated and rented out plots.  
Table 4 presents the results of the switching regressions. As in Table 3, column 1 
contains the results of a panel data probit regression of the covariates on the decision to 
rent out land, while column 2 presents the effects on productivity on rented out plots, 
corrected for selection into renting out, and column 3 displays the effects on 
productivity on self-managed plots, corrected for selection into renting out.
 
 
<< Table 4 about here >> 
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Our analysis suggests a positive and significant effect of land certification on the 
decision to rent out a plot. The results also show that women are significantly more 
likely to rent out land. However, we do not find that the effect of certification is 
significantly stronger for plots belonging to female-headed households. In addition, 
conditional on the decision to rent out land, and corrected for potential selection bias, 
we do not find a significant relationship between certification and productivity on 
rented out plots. While the not-so-strong links between the productivity of rented out 
land and certification appear surprising, this can be explained by the corresponding 
results for owner-operated plots and certification.  
As discussed in section 1 and 2, the observed positive effect of certification on 
the productivity of self-managed plots may come from two sources. First, if land 
certification reduces the fear of land redistribution by the government or land grabbing 
by tenants, it may increase incentives for farm households to undertake short- and long-
term investments on the land. This, in turn, is likely to increase productivity on plots 
operated by the landowners themselves (owner-operated plots). Second, if households 
have insufficient access to labour and draught power to farm their land efficiently, and 
if certification has made it safer or at least easier to rent out land, we may expect that 
certification has also made the self-managed land size more optimal in relation to inputs 
available to the household. In other words, certification may have led to a more optimal 
level of renting out, so that the land area actually operated by the farm household is 
balanced to the non-tradable, non-land factor endowments such as labour and oxen 
available to the household.   
The results suggest that female-headed households are significantly more likely 
to rent out plots than are male-headed households, and that the effect is relatively 
large19. Based on the discussion in section 1 and 2, this result is expected. We do not 
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find a significant increase in plot productivity for female-headed households relative to 
male-headed households due to certification (column 2 and 4). This result suggests that 
certification has not managed to completely close the gender gap in productivity on 
rented out plots. However, note that the effect of certification on female-headed 
household is positive and significant when certification is identified at the household 
level, and that having a female head is not associated with significantly lower 
productivity on self-managed plots. This is interesting because we found a relatively 
strong and negative effect of female heads in the regressions where we did not correct 
for selection.  
At first sight, it is somewhat surprising that farm size (total landholdings) is a 
negative determinant of the renting out decision. Intuitively, more land combined with 
capital and labour scarcity should be associated with a larger tendency to rent out land. 
However, the result may be explained by fear of redistribution if households with large 
land holdings are more likely to be targets of redistribution and if renting out land 
signals excessive holdings. 
To generate a valid corrector for selection bias, we used experience of land 
conflict and experience of land loss as exclusion variables in the probit regression for 
the decision to rent out land. The main motivation for using these variables as identifiers 
for the decision to rent out land is that these two variables should be related to incentives 
(or disincentives) to rent out land, but there is little reason to believe that they should 
affect productivity.  
Our analysis shows that land conflict is positively associated with land market 
participation, while experience of land loss has a negative impact. Conflict over land 
could arise from either inheritance or poorly demarcated borders, while loss of land is 
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generally associated with the land being a target of local government level 
redistribution.  
As described above, we estimate a correction factor (the inverse Mills ratio, imr) 
from the selection equation for each year. As can be seen in Table 4, the coefficient on 
the inverse Mills ratio is positive and significant for self-managed plots, using both 
levels of certification20. This result suggests that self-managed plots have a 
systematically higher level of productivity than rented-out plots. 
7. Conclusions 
The central hypothesis tested in this paper is to what extent gender-based differences in 
tenure insecurity that translate into gaps in productivity are narrowed down by a 
security-enhancing land reform intervention, such as the Ethiopian Land certification 
Program. 
Our results suggest that, in accordance with expectations, certification has had 
positive effects on productivity. Furthermore, the certification program is shown to 
have particularly benefitted female-headed households, indicating that it tends to relax 
constraints related to tenure security by a relatively greater margin than that experienced 
by male-headed households. Finally, we show that the increase in productivity of 
female-headed households partly stems from the positive impact of certification on 
female-headed households’ tendency to participate in the land rental market. However, 
due to the short time lapse since the implementation of the program, we did not look 
into the long-term productivity effects. 
It should be noted that the analysis does not go into the possible impacts of the 
program on crop selection and its impact on productivity. Given the multi-cropping 
nature of the farms, with about 40 different types of crops under consideration, going 
in depth into crop choice analysis might shift the focus away from analysis of gender 
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and productivity and land certification. For the future, a more detailed analysis of crop 
choice and yield differences across crop types and optimal crop portfolio, in the context 
of gender differentials in productivity, could better illuminate our understanding of 
these relationships.  
Pre-certificate levels of tenure insecurity may differ depending on whether land 
is acquired independently from the government or through inheritance from family or 
husband. The level and source of insecurity in the two cases, as well as their impact on 
land market participation, are likely to be different. Such heterogeneity is interesting 
from both academic and policy perspectives, and is worth investigating as a separate 
future research question.  
Looking into intra-household gender dynamics in the context of certification 
would also be an interesting addition to the literature. Indeed, many have argued that, 
in patriarchal societies, independent or joint ownership is essential to women’s access 
to control over land (Giovarelli and Lastarria-Cornhiel, 2004), in spite of gender-neutral 
laws and even gender-sensitive legislation and land programs (Deere and Leon, 2001). 
Accordingly, recent land reforms in developing countries increasingly emphasize joint 
ownership of land for husbands and wives (Holden et al., 2011). Studies assessing joint 
titling programs in many cases show that it has promoted better land rights for women 
(Lastarria-Cornhiel et al., 2003; Gebru, 2011). Analysis of joint titling in the context of 
Ethiopia would be even more interesting due to heterogeneity across regions, with some 
regions not incorporating joint certification for husband and wife.  
At a more general level, an important stride has been made in survey designs 
incorporating gender-disaggregated data at a household level, which enabled 
comparison of the performance of male- and female-owned farms, as in the analysis in 
this paper. However, greater efforts are needed to capture the intra-household gender 
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dynamics through collecting detailed information on gender-based plot management 
and decision making.  
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Table 1: Key household and farm characteristics by gender of household head 
          
 Male   Female  
  Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev 
Household characteristics         
Household head       
Age 50.73 15.23 54.15 15.41 
Iliiterate 0.49 0.50 0.87 0.34 
N male adults in hh 2.25 1.26 1.31 1.19 
N female adults in hh 1.99 1.10 2.11 1.07 
Livestock (TLU) 4.89 3.63 2.59 2.76 
Oxen (N) 1.92 1.47 0.97 1.22 
Land area (hectar) 1.93 1.39 1.29 1.04 
Household rents out land 0.10 0.30 0.32 0.47 
Experience of land loss 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.21 
Experience of land conflict 
CONconflict 
0.20 0.40 0.20 0.40 
Expect increase in holdings  0.22 0.41 0.19 0.39 
Expe t decrease in holdings 0.31 0.46 0.35 0.47 
Expect no change in holdings 0.32 0.47 0.34 0.48 
Uncertain about changes 0.15 0.35 0.11 0.31 
N obs 2675   504   
Plot characteristics         
Plot area 0.34 0.32 0.31 0.25 
Fertile soil 0.48 0.50 0.58 0.49 
Non-fertile soil 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.31 
Flat slope 0.69 0.46 0.75 0.43 
Steep slope 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20 
N obs 13378   1808   
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Table 2: Characteristics of owner-operated and rented out plots 
  
Owner_operated 
plots 
Rented out 
plots  
  Mean Std.dev Mean Std.dev 
Household head         
Age 56,43 17,68 51,09 14,55 
Female 0,37 0,48 0,07 0,25 
Illiterate 0,70 0,46 0,51 0,50 
N male adults in hh 1,48 1,12 2,36 1,30 
N female adults in hh 1,95 1,12 2,06 1,08 
Livestock (TLU) 1,48 2,19 5,10 3,37 
Oxen (N) 0,42 0,90 2,00 1,34 
Land area (hectares) 1,45 1,16 2,12 1,43 
Fertile land 0,43 0,50 0,50 0,50 
Flat slope  0,66 0,47 0,66 0,47 
N 11228  1055  
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Table 3. Productivity regression estimation results 
    KEBELE LEVEL CERTIFICATION       HH LEVEL CERTIFICATION   
 Pooled Rented out Female head  Pooled Rented out Female head 
    plots       plots   
Hh i treated village 0.495*** 0.000 -0.034     -0.039 0.136 0.008    
 (0.070) (0.345) (0.142)     (0.043) (0.200) (0.107)    
Post treatment 0.180*** -0.109 0.414**   0.118** -0.154 0.168    
 (0.052) (0.283) (0.184)     (0.053) (0.228) (0.148)    
Female head * post treatment 0.274** 0.272   0.092 0.427*  
 (0.117) (0.295)   (0.093) (0.223)  
Year=2007 -0.325*** -0.012 -0.240**   -0.301*** -0.009 -0.243**  
 (0.033) (0.160) (0.117)     (0.033) (0.148) (0.108)    
Household head is female -0.170*** -0.320**   -0.165*** -0.375***  
 (0.051) (0.136)   (0.049) (0.130)  
Age of hh head -0.003*** 0.002 -0.005*    -0.002* 0.002 0.000    
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)     (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)    
Rented out plots 0.200***  0.294***  0.224***  0.222*** 
 (0.047)  (0.090)     (0.046)  (0.074)    
Hh head is illiterate 0.054* -0.075 -0.135     0.019 0.010 -0.180    
 (0.032) (0.143) (0.155)     (0.030) (0.124) (0.120)    
Total land holdings by hh  -0.787*** -1.041** -0.517     -0.825*** -0.991*** -0.687    
 (0.135) (0.430) (0.443)     (0.147) (0.367) (0.423)    
Plot size in hectares: calculated -1.125*** -1.675*** -1.246***  -1.165*** -1.516*** -1.239*** 
 (0.060) (0.205) (0.175)     (0.060) (0.172) (0.146)    
N male adults in hh 0.021 0.085 0.042     0.009 0.114 0.035    
 (0.050) (0.228) (0.045)     (0.050) (0.211) (0.035)    
N male adults in hh squared 0.003 0.013   0.009 -0.001  
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 (0.005) (0.028)   (0.006) (0.027)  
N livestock per hectare 0.046*** 0.021   0.006*** 0.002  
 (0.009) (0.048)   (0.002) (0.042)  
N oxen per hectare 0.010 -0.007 0.069***  0.055*** 0.064 0.175**  
 (0.013) (0.109) (0.021)     (0.017) (0.100) (0.077)    
Soil type (color) of parcel:black 0.012 0.036 -0.113     0.012 0.002 -0.025    
 (0.043) (0.156) (0.127)     (0.044) (0.151) (0.118)    
Soil type (color) of parcel:red 0.007 0.083 0.090     -0.001 0.048 0.067    
 (0.043) (0.160) (0.124)     (0.043) (0.157) (0.114)    
Slope of parcel:meda 0.055 0.083 0.003     0.078* 0.086 -0.001    
 (0.048) (0.315) (0.164)     (0.045) (0.302) (0.134)    
Slope of parcel:dagetama 0.045 0.113 0.015     0.051 0.139 -0.004    
 (0.050) (0.296) (0.174)     (0.047) (0.286) (0.144)    
Soil quality of parcel:lem 0.070* 0.017 -0.081     0.063* -0.011 0.056    
 (0.037) (0.156) (0.110)     (0.035) (0.138) (0.092)    
Soil quality of parcel: lem-tef 0.034 0.021 -0.014     0.048 -0.092 0.110    
 (0.035) (0.142) (0.116)     (0.033) (0.123) (0.090)    
Tenant under 30 years old   0.459    0.413  
   (0.283)    (0.261)  
Tenant owns land   -0.082    0.027  
   (0.149)    (0.132)  
Tenant owns oxen   0.062    0.010  
   (0.053)    (0.030)  
Land rented out to relative   0.189    0.169  
   (0.161)    (0.145)  
Chamberlain- Mundlak Effects YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
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Kebele fixed effects YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
         
Constant 6.907*** 7.129*** 7.078***  7.518*** 7.264*** 7.372*** 
 (0.100) (0.395) (0.305)     (0.093) (0.461) (0.305)    
         
Chi2 2223.288 318.841 181.422      2058.710 342.200 506.832    
N 12217 709 1261   13395 808 1618 
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Table 4. Switching regression estimation results 
    KEBELE LEVEL CERTIFICATION       HH LEVEL CERTIFICATION   
 Decision to  Rented out Self managed  Decision to  Rented out Self managed 
  rent out plots plots   rent out plots plots 
         
Hh i treated village -0.177 -0.224 0.476***  -0.349** 0.149 -0.073    
 (0.339) (0.397) (0.063)     (0.169) (0.212) (0.054)    
Post treatment 0.274* -0.124 0.243***  0.301** -0.145 0.169**  
 (0.142) (0.322) (0.048)     (0.137) (0.234) (0.068)    
Female head * post treatment 0.076 0.372 0.197     -0.129 0.459** -0.066    
 (0.231) (0.276) (0.133)     (0.187) (0.226) (0.098)    
Year dummy, 2006 -0.378*** 0.160 -0.383***  -0.292*** 0.104 -0.361*** 
 (0.077) (0.167) (0.029)     (0.075) (0.129) (0.033)    
Household head is female 1.088*** -0.704*** -0.089     1.249*** -0.700** -0.030    
 (0.149) (0.251) (0.064)     (0.144) (0.305) (0.068)    
Age of hh head 0.021*** -0.006 -0.002*    0.024*** -0.004 -0.001    
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.001)     (0.003) (0.006) (0.001)    
Hh head is illiterate -0.089 -0.017 0.034     -0.136 0.068 -0.008    
 (0.106) (0.162) (0.025)     (0.103) (0.126) (0.027)    
Total land holdings by hh 10 ha -3.241*** -0.040 -0.728***  -3.020*** -0.290 -0.801*** 
 (0.397) (0.790) (0.150)     (0.362) (0.628) (0.188)    
Plot size in hectars: calculated 0.503*** -1.845*** -1.123***  0.487*** -1.606*** -1.161*** 
 (0.099) (0.230) (0.062)     (0.095) (0.177) (0.064)    
N male adults in hh -0.351** 0.200 -0.020     -0.399*** 0.194 -0.021    
 (0.148) (0.236) (0.055)     (0.140) (0.176) (0.044)    
N male adults in hh squared 0.052** -0.005 0.010*    0.052** -0.014 0.016*** 
 (0.023) (0.036) (0.005)     (0.022) (0.031) (0.006)    
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N livestock per hectare 0.005 -0.006 0.048***  -0.004 -0.008 0.007    
 (0.030) (0.059) (0.010)     (0.023) (0.050) (0.018)    
N oxen per hectare -0.406*** 0.135 0.009     -0.383*** 0.176 0.047    
 (0.069) (0.134) (0.031)     (0.059) (0.138) (0.038)    
Soil quality of parcel:lem -0.418*** 0.086 0.046     -0.376*** 0.011 0.039    
 (0.101) (0.176) (0.035)     (0.097) (0.117) (0.040)    
Soil quality of parcel: lem-tef -0.185* 0.082 0.035     -0.165* -0.074 0.045    
 (0.095) (0.156) (0.036)     (0.091) (0.101) (0.035)    
Soil type (color) of parcel:black -0.062 0.012 0.018     -0.001 -0.019 0.003    
 (0.123) (0.160) (0.050)     (0.121) (0.150) (0.044)    
Soil type (color) of parcel:red -0.249** 0.135 -0.003     -0.192 0.074 -0.025    
 (0.126) (0.185) (0.050)     (0.124) (0.193) (0.044)    
Slope of parcel:meda -0.088 -0.024 0.071     -0.091 0.002 0.092*   
 (0.136) (0.359) (0.048)     (0.133) (0.308) (0.050)    
Slope of parcel:dagetama 0.037 0.038 0.068     0.070 0.069 0.073    
 (0.139) (0.355) (0.056)     (0.137) (0.293) (0.050)    
Tenant under 30 years old   0.443*    0.417  
   (0.248)    (0.263)  
Tenant owns land   -0.083    0.027  
   (0.162)    (0.119)  
Tenant owns oxen   0.058    0.005  
   (0.057)    (0.033)  
Land rented out to relative   0.184    0.158  
   (0.183)    (0.157)  
Experience of land conflict 0.296***    0.301***   
 (0.089)    (0.085)   
Experience of land loss -0.431**    -0.358**   
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 (0.170)    (0.158)   
Inversed Mill's ratio   -2.894 0.749*     -2.177 1.014**  
   (1.786) (0.428)      (1.660) (0.400)    
Chamberlain- Mundlak Effects YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
         
Kebele fixed effects YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
         
Constant -0.585 9.057*** 6.425***  -0.993*** 8.604*** 6.851*** 
 (0.367) (1.187) (0.289)     (0.370) (1.100) (0.303)    
lnsig2u         
Constant 0.670***    0.686***   
 (0.114)    (0.108)   
Adjusted_r2   0.211 0.277        0.199 0.268    
Chi2 533.7427 2392.882 5165.002     572.3385 3471.459 11659.65    
N 12217 709 11174   13395 808 12226 
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Appendix A:  Characterisation of the study setting and description of the variables 
used in the regressions 
The agricultural system in the study area is characterized as a mixed crop-livestock 
farming system. Crops are grown on individual farms, while livestock are herded on 
communal grazing lands, which are the major sources of animal feed. The cropping 
system itself is a multi-cropping system where a farm is divided into several plots, with 
each plot allotted to a single crop. The crop production system consists of cereals, 
pulses, legumes, oil seeds and other crops, with a given farm typically growing different 
crop types.  
The definition of variables used in the analysis and the descriptive statistics are 
presented in Table A1 and Table A2, respectively. The descriptive statistics are 
categorized as the pooled sample and the treatment and gender categories.  
<<Table A1 about here>> 
<<Table A2 about here>> 
 
Dependent variable: plot-level productivity 
The major dependent variable, plot-level productivity, is measured as the crop revenue 
per hectare. The purpose of the conversion into revenue is to enable comparison across 
crops; because this is a plot-level analysis (as opposed to a farm-level analysis), no 
aggregation is made across crops. As expected, average productivity
 
is significantly 
higher in kebeles belonging to the treatment group. The distribution of crops grown by 
male- and female-headed households appears to show no significant difference, as 
presented in Table A3. 
 <<Table A3about here>> 
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Socioeconomic characteristics 
 
Slightly over half the respondents in the sample are illiterate. For female-headed 
households, this figure is much higher; about 86 percent are illiterate. While the 
proportion of illiterate male heads of household is significantly lower in certified than 
non-certified kebeles, no significant difference in literacy can be found for female-
headed households between certified and non-certified kebeles. The average number of 
male and female adults per hectare is about 2.  
Female-headed households have fewer adult male members and more adult 
female members. Households in certification kebeles have a significantly lower number 
of male adults compared to households in non-certified kebeles; in addition, male-
headed households in certification kebeles own significantly more land than their 
counterparts in non-certification kebeles. With regard to indicators of wealth, such as 
number of oxen and livestock, there are no significant differences between female-
headed households in certified and non-certified villages. However, male-headed 
households in certification villages own significantly more oxen and livestock 
(measured in tropical livestock units) per hectare than their counterparts in control 
villages.  In addition, households in treatment kebeles rent out land to a slightly lesser 
extent than households in the control kebeles. 
Physical farm characteristics 
 
Four measures of plot characteristics are identified in our data: plot size, plot slope, soil 
fertility and soil colour. The average plot size is slightly higher for certified than non-
certified households. On average, 69% and 77% of the plots in the certified and non-
certified category are flat, with moderately steep and steep plots making up the rest. In 
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addition to topographic features, plots are defined by their soil colour, which is also a 
rough representation of other features such as water retention capacity and texture. 
Accordingly, black soil has clayish texture with maximum water retention capacity, 
while reddish or brownish soil has medium texture and light-coloured soil has coarse 
texture (Coobels et al., 2008). A larger proportion of plots per farm have black or red 
soil colour in both of the certification categories. 
 Further assessment of soil fertility maintenance measures indicates that farmers 
in the study area adopt a wide range of soil and water conservation technologies. These 
include stone bund terrace (41%), soil bund terrace (24.5%), fanjo and grass planting 
(20%), cut-off drain, check dam construction or river diversion (19%).  Farmers that 
did not participate in any type of conservation activity make up about 21% of the total 
sample.  
Manure use could, to some degree, be correlated with oxen availability, 
although there are other farm animals that contribute to manure, such as sheep, goats 
and cows. From anecdotal evidence and our observations in the study area, manure is 
used as fertilizer on plots and also as complementary building material for walls and 
floors of mud buildings. It is also used for smoothing the floors of houses, which do not 
normally have any flooring. Animal dung accounts for 12 percent of the total energy 
demand of farm households (WBISPP, 2004). We do not have full information on 
exactly how manure is allocated into different uses; it can be argued that a good portion 
of it is used on farms. Manure is likely to be applied on plots that are closer to the 
homestead due to its bulky nature.  
 
Tenure security measures 
 
 39 
Our survey data consists of three alternative measures of tenure security: perception, 
experience of conflict and changes in the size of land holdings. The perception variable 
is based on the question of whether the household expects to experience increase, 
decrease or no change in its land holdings in the coming five years. The respondents 
chose between expectations of ‘increase’, ‘decrease’, ‘no change’ or ‘do not know’. 
Land conflict is a dummy variable based on the question ‘Have you ever faced any 
conflicts or claims regarding the land you own?’ The experience of change in the size 
of holdings is related to the question of whether there were changes in the area of land 
under the ‘ownership’ of the household during the two years before the corresponding 
survey. The respondents answers – ‘gain’, ‘loss’, or no change –depended on their 
experience of changes in the size of their holdings. The ‘loss’ variable is a dummy 
variable taking the value one if the respondent answered that he/she lost land during the 
past two-year period. Loss includes loss of land due to village redistribution, land 
reallocation and family redistribution. Unlike the change in land holding, the conflict 
does not have a time period specified. The lack of a time frame in the conflict variable 
may lead to potential bias with respect to the likelihood of conflict resolution with the 
passage of time. The descriptive statistics further suggest that a high share of sampled 
households are tenure insecure: about 20 percent of the households have experienced 
land-related conflict. Households in certification villages are less likely to have 
experienced land conflict or land loss. However, there is no significant difference in 
land loss for female-headed households.  
 
<<Table A1 about here>> 
<<Table A2 about here>> 
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Appendix B: Generating comparable samples and ensuring randomness between 
treated and non-treated groups 
 Appendix B1: Generating comparable groups based on observables – PSM  
In order to minimize differences between our treated and non-treated groups, in terms 
of observable characteristics, we conduct a propensity score matching (PSM) 
procedure. In order to facilitate reading, we only describe the purpose and intuition of 
the PSM method here (for a slightly more technical description, see Appendix 2). The 
main purpose of PSM is to choose a sample of households in the treatment and control 
groups that are as similar as possible to each other in important observed aspects. More 
specifically, PSM balances the observed distribution of covariates across households in 
the two groups21. Assuming that the balancing is successful, the conditional probability 
of participation in the program (i.e., receiving a certificate) should be equal in treatment 
and control groups.  The difference in this conditional probability is called the 
‘propensity score’ and is the relevant summary statistic evaluated to ensure that the 
samples are sufficiently balanced (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). The matched samples 
are then used for the difference-in-difference analysis. 
 
<<Table B1 about here>> 
 
 
Appendix B2:  Results for the common trend assumption test 
As discussed in section 5, the validity of the difference-in-difference results hinges on 
the assumption of common trends, i.e., the assumption that the trend in productivity 
would have been the same in the two groups in the absence of certification. The results 
from the common trends analysis are presented in Table B2 below. The figures 
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represent a test of the extent to which the change in the intercept (i.e., the trend) is 
significantly different between certified and non-certified villages in the pre-
certification time period. As can be seen in the table, the test suggests that, between the 
years 2000 and 2002, there was indeed a significant difference in the trend between the 
two groups. However, for the time period 2002 and 2004, this difference is 
insignificant. In other words, the productivity patterns in the treatment villages seem to 
have been relatively parallel to those of the control villages during the pre-policy 
change period in the years 2002 and 2004. This finding is similar to Deininger et al. 
(2011), who, using the same data for their analysis, find similar evidence of only a slight 
difference in trends within their variables of interest.  
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Table A1: Variable description 
Variable name Variable description 
Female head of hh 1 = female household head, 0 = male household head 
Age of hh head Household head’s age (in years) 
Household head illiterate 1 = illiterate, 0 = other 
N. male adults Number of male working-age family members in hh  
N. female adults Number of female working-age family members in hh  
Oxen per hectare Number of oxen per hectare 
Livestock per hectare Number of livestock in tropical livestock units per hectare  
Landholdings (ha) Total farm size in hectares 
Fertile soil 1 = plot has highly fertile soil, 0 = other soil fertility 
Medium fertile plot 1 = plot has medium fertile soil, 0 = other soil fertility 
Infertile plot (reference) 1 = plot has infertile soil, 0 = other soil fertility 
Black soil  1 = plot has black soil, 0 = other color of soil 
Red soil  1 = plot has red soil, 0 = other color of soil 
Other soil (reference) 1 = plot has grey, white or sandy soil, 0 = other color of soil 
Flat slope 1 = plot has flat slope, 0 = other slope of plot 
Medium slope 1 = plot has medium slope, 0 = other slope of plot 
Steep slope 1 = plot has steep slope, 0 = other slope of plot 
Plot size in ha Total plot size (in hectares) 
Conflict 
1 = hh has experienced land-related conflict in the past 5 years,  
0 = no experience of land conflict 
Loss 
1= hh has lost land in the past 5 years (due to, e.g., sales, conflict 
or redistribution), 0= no experience of land loss 
Tenant is 30 years or younger 
1= tenant is 30 years of age or younger 
0= tenant is over 30 years of age 
Tenant owns land 1= tenant owns land, 0= tenant does not own land 
N oxen owned by tenant Number of oxen owned by the tenant 
Land rented out to relative 
1= land is rented out to relative,  
0= land is rented out to non-relative  
Self-managed plots 
1= plot is managed by owner 
2= plot is managed by tenant (rented out) 
Hh in the treated village 
1 = plot/hh is located in treatment kebele  
0 = plot/hh is located in control kebele 
Post treatment  
1= plot/hh is located in treatment kebele and time period is after 
certification, 0= otherwise  
Value of plot output per hectare The log of the value of output per hectare 
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Table A2:     Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Regressions for the years 2005 and 2007 
    Total sample     Female headed hh   Male headed hh 
 Control Certification p-value of Control Certification p-value of Control Certification p-value of 
  villages villages differences villages villages differences villages villages differences 
Household characteristics                   
N 1879 1300   273 242   1606 1058   
Female headed hh 0,145 0,186 0,001          
Age of hh head 51,458 49,396 0,000 52,766 50,798 0,100 51,236 49,076 0,000 
Hh head is illiterate 0,573 0,514 0,001 0,861 0,860 0,483 0,524 0,435 0,000 
No male adults 2,179 1,981 0,000 1,509 1,128 0,000 2,293 2,176 0,009 
No female adults 2,047 1,964 0,018 2,231 1,946 0,001 2,016 1,968 0,140 
Landholdings (ha) 1,739 1,960 0,000 1,302 1,283 0,420 1,813 2,115 0,000 
Livestock per ha 3,002 4,805 0,001 2,502 5,010 0,122 3,087 4,758 0,001 
Oxen per ha 1,225 1,495 0,014 0,967 1,326 0,205 1,269 1,534 0,008 
               
Experience of land conflict 0,220 0,178 0,001 0,238 0,165 0,020 0,217 0,181 0,010 
Experience of land loss 0,108 0,065 0,000 0,062 0,050 0,266 0,116 0,068 0,000 
               
Plot-level characteristics                   
N 8172 7083   892 973   7280 6110   
Ln(value of yield) 6,627 6,802 0,000 6,466 6,767 0,000 6,647 6,808 0,000 
Rented out plots 0,089 0,078 0,007 0,281 0,282 0,496 0,065 0,045 0,000 
Self-managed plots 0,911 0,922 0,007 0,719 0,718 0,504 0,935 0,955 0,000 
               
Plot area 0,356 0,319 0,000 0,343 0,274 0,000 0,358 0,326 0,000 
Fertile soil 0,461 0,526 0,000 0,534 0,618 0,000 0,452 0,511 0,000 
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medium fertile soil 0,379 0,338 0,000 0,323 0,300 0,145 0,386 0,345 0,000 
Not fertile soil 0,158 0,136 0,000 0,143 0,082 0,000 0,160 0,144 0,005 
other soil 0,002 0,000 0,000      0,002  0,000 
Black soil 0,472 0,368 0,000 0,474 0,474 0,493 0,472 0,351 0,000 
Red Soil 0,424 0,605 0,000 0,393 0,492 0,000 0,428 0,623 0,000 
Other colour of soil 0,103 0,027 0,000 0,132 0,034 0,000 0,100 0,026 0,000 
Slope of plot: Steep 0,065 0,027 0,000 0,070 0,070 0,000 0,065 0,028 0,000 
Slope of plot: Medium 0,303 0,203 0,000 0,262 0,161 0,000 0,308 0,209 0,000 
Slope of plot: Flat 0,628 0,767 0,000 0,668 0,816 0,000 0,623 0,760 0,000 
               
Tenant characteristics                   
N 293 189   108 82   185 107   
Young tenant (<30 years) 0,345 0,312 0,229 0,318 0,293 0,356 0,357 0,327 0,304 
Tenant owns land 0,857 0,868 0,365 0,879 0,854 0,312 0,843 0,879 0,198 
No oxen, tenant 2,150 2,958 0,000 2,140 2,817 0,006 2,168 3,065 0,000 
                    
 
 45 
 
Table B1: Propensity score matching results 
            
Sample Pseudo R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 MeanBias MedBias 
Kebele level certification     
Women           
Raw 0.179 67.67 0.000 21.1 16.1 
Matched 0.008 1.69 1.000 2.8 3.0 
Men       
Raw 0.167 303.22 0.000 14.9 12.7 
Matched 0.005 5.12 0.954 2.7 2.0 
Household level 
certification     
Raw 0.036 60.57 0.000 9.5 10.9 
Matched 0.013 12.64 0.555 2.9 2.5 
 
 
Table B2: Test of the Common Trends Assumption 
 Kebele level certification hh level certification 
 Chi-2 Prob>chi2 Chi-2 Prob>chi2 
2000-2002 55.40 0.000 3.8 0.051 
2002-2004 1.58 0.2085 0.34 0.563 
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Appendix C: Regression results in elasticity form 
 
Table C1. Productivity regression estimation results: Elasticities 
              
  KEBELE LEVEL CERTIFICATION  HH LEVEL CERTIFICATION 
 Pooled Rented out  Female Pooled Rented out  Female 
  Plots headed hh  plots headed hh 
              
Household  in treated village, 0.074*** 0.000 0.077 -0.006 0.020 0.001 
dummy (0.011) (0.050) (0.047) (0.006) (0.029) (0.016) 
Post treatment dummy 0.027*** -0.016 0.067** 0.018** -0.022 0.026 
 (0.008) (0.041) (0.028) (0.008) (0.033) (0.023) 
Female head dummy * post 
treatment dummy 0.041** -0.002  0.014 0.062*  
 (0.018) (0.023)  (0.014) (0.033)  
year==19992005 -0.049*** 0.040 -0.041** -0.045*** -0.001 -0.037** 
 (0.005) (0.043) (0.018) (0.005) (0.022) (0.016) 
Household head is female -0.026*** -0.047**  -0.025*** -0.055**  
 (0.008) (0.020)  (0.007) (0.019)  
Age of hh head -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Rented out plots 0.030***  0.025* 0.033***  0.034** 
 (0.007)  (0.013) (0.007)  (0.011) 
Hh head is illiterate 0.008* -0.011 -0.034* 0.003 0.001 -0.027 
 (0.005) (0.021) (0.020) (0.005) (0.018) (0.018) 
Total land holdings by hh 10 ha -0.118*** -0.152** -0.119 -0.123*** -0.144** -0.099 
 (0.020) (0.063) (0.074) (0.022) (0.053) (0.065) 
Plot size in hectars: calculated -0.169*** -0.245*** -0.186*** -0.174*** -0.221*** -0.188*** 
 (0.009) (0.030) (0.028) (0.009) (0.025) (0.022) 
Number of male adults in hh 0.003 0.012 0.011 0.001 0.017 0.005 
 (0.008) (0.033) (0.012) (0.007) (0.031) (0.011) 
Number of male adults in hh 
squared 0.001 0.002 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
N livestock per hectar (tropical 
livestock units) 0.007*** 0.003 -0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.007) (0.004) (0.000) (0.006) (0.002) 
Number of oxen per hectar 0.001 -0.001 0.011** 0.008*** 0.009 0.023* 
 (0.002) (0.016) (0.005) (0.003) (0.015) (0.012) 
Soil characteristics  YES   YES  
Tenant landlord-relationships  YES   YES  
 
Table C2. Switching regression estimation results: Elasticities: 
          
 kebele level certification Hh level certification 
 Rented out  
owner-
operated Rented out  
owner-
operated 
 47 
 plots Plots plots plots 
          
hh i treated village -0.033 0.072*** 0.022 -0.011 
 (0.058) (0.009) (0.031) (0.008) 
post treatment -0.018 0.0365*** -0.021 0.025** 
 (0.047) (0.007) (0.034) (0.010) 
Female head * post treatment 0.054 0.030 0.015 -0.054*** 
 (0.040) (0.020) (0.019) (0.005) 
ethyear==1999 0.023 -0.058*** 0.067** -0.010 
 (0.024) (0.004) (0.033) (0.015) 
Household head is female -0.103** -0.013 -0.102** -0.004 
 (0.037) (0.010) (0.044) (0.010) 
Age of hh head -0.001 -0.000* -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Hh head is illiterate -0.003 0.005 0.010 -0.001 
 (0.024) (0.004) (0.018) (0.004) 
Total land holdings by hh 10 ha -0.006 -0.109*** -0.042 -0.120*** 
 (0.115) (0.023) (0.091) (0.028) 
Plot size in hectars: calculated -0.270*** -0.169*** -0.234*** -0.174*** 
 (0.033) (0.009) (0.026) (0.010) 
N male adults in hh 0.029 -0.003 0.028 -0.003 
 (0.034) (0.008) (0.026) (0.007) 
N male adults in hh squared -0.001 0.002* -0.002 0.002** 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
N livestock per hectar -0.001 0.007*** -0.001 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) 
N oxen per hectar 0.020 0.001 0.026 0.007 
 (0.020) (0.005) (0.020) (0.006) 
Inverse Mill's ratio -0.423 0.113* -0.317 0.152** 
 (0.262) (0.064) (0.241) (0.060) 
Soil Characteristics YES  YES  
Tenant-landlord relationships YES  YES  
 
Appendix D: Selection equations – estimation of year-specific inverse Mill’s ratio 
 
            
 Kebele level certification hh level certification  
 Decision to rent out land Decision to rent out land  
  1997 1999 1997 1999   
       
Hh in treated village -0.289* 0.908*** -0.142* -0.142     
 (0.173) (0.227)    (0.077) (0.092)     
Household head is female 0.675*** 0.619*** 0.756*** 0.758***  
 (0.073) (0.096)    (0.068) (0.085)     
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Age of hh head 0.011*** 0.025*** 0.014*** 0.024***  
 (0.002) (0.002)    (0.002) (0.002)     
Hh head is illiterate 0.047 -0.195**  -0.013 -0.187**   
 (0.061) (0.081)    (0.060) (0.076)     
Total land holdings by hh 10 ha -3.701*** -2.729*** -3.631*** -2.411***  
 (0.380) (0.324)    (0.363) (0.279)     
Plot size in hectares: calculated 0.333*** 0.546*** 0.327*** 0.416***  
 (0.094) (0.142)    (0.094) (0.129)     
N male adults in hh -0.170 -0.166    -0.345*** -0.031     
 (0.123) (0.130)    (0.116) (0.127)     
N male adults in hh squared 0.017 0.041*** 0.023* 0.027*    
 (0.013) (0.014)    (0.013) (0.015)     
N livestock per hectare -0.119*** 0.166*** -0.087*** 0.093***  
 (0.030) (0.029)    (0.027) (0.022)     
N oxen per hectare -0.467*** -0.503*** -0.459*** -0.450***  
 (0.049) (0.056)    (0.047) (0.054)     
Soil quality of parcel:lem -0.175** -0.354*** -0.169** -0.311***  
 (0.081) (0.106)    (0.079) (0.099)     
Soil quality of parcel: lem-tef -0.104 -0.232**  -0.082 -0.194**   
 (0.076) (0.105)    (0.074) (0.098)     
Soil type (color) of parcel:black 0.210* -0.078    0.194* -0.046     
 (0.115) (0.118)    (0.117) (0.113)     
Soil type (color) of parcel:red -0.004 -0.203    -0.037 -0.174     
 (0.116) (0.123)    (0.118) (0.117)     
Slope of parcel:meda -0.014 0.097    -0.067 0.115     
 (0.117) (0.162)    (0.115) (0.154)     
Slope of parcel:dagetama 0.073 0.006    0.022 0.031     
 (0.119) (0.169)    (0.117) (0.161)     
Experience of land conflict 0.228*** 0.061    0.181*** 0.084     
 (0.064) (0.081)    (0.061) (0.074)     
Experience of land loss -0.827*** -0.053    -0.879*** 0.020     
 (0.161) (0.151)    (0.162) (0.130)     
       
Chamberlain- Mundlak Effects YES YES YES YES  
       
Kebele fixed effects YES YES YES YES  
       
Constant -0.111 -1.314*** -0.422* -0.659**   
 (0.227) (0.300)    (0.224) (0.266)     
       
chi2 1529.949 937.625    1690.977 1103.189      
N 6278 5939 6854 6541   
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1 Secure property rights are shown to lead to enhanced investment and increased productivity (e.g., Besley, 1995; 
Deininger and Jin, 2006; Lanjouw and Levy, 2002; Do and Iyer, 2002; Feder 1988). Similarly, allocative 
efficiency of land rental markets is enhanced by increased tenure security (Otsuka, 2007; de Janvry et al., 2001; 
Holden et al., 2008).  
2 The focus on women is crucial given that gender gaps in agricultural productivity have been documented by 
many studies across the developing world (e.g., Sridhar 2008; Tikabo 2003; Agarwal 2003; Holden et al., 2001; 
Cook 1999; Quisumbing, 1996; Udry 1996). 
 
3 The exorbitant transaction costs associated with the markets for complementary non-land factors (i.e., labour 
and oxen) bar them from playing effective factor adjustment roles, making the land rental market a more effective 
factor ratio equalizing mechanism (e.g., Bliss and Stern, 1982; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1985; Skofias, 1995; 
Sadoulet et al., 2001).  
4 Women may also have limited access to agricultural technologies and credit markets, associated with their 
perceived position as farmers (Fletschner and Kenney, 2011; Umeta, 2013). 
5 This was confirmed to the authors by informal discussions with female heads of households who felt that, 
although they are free by law to rent land to whomever they prefer, they would be alienated by their in-laws if 
they rejected the tenancy arrangement. Holden and Bezabih (2008) found significantly higher levels of 
inefficiency linked to contracts of female landlords with in-law tenants, owing to the difficulty of evicting one’s 
relatives and the high transaction costs of screening and selecting better tenants.  
6 In line with this, Bellemare (2010) argue that, when choosing the terms of contract, the landlord considers the 
impact of his/her choice on the probability that he/she will retain future rights to the rented land. On the tenant’s 
part, expectations of being evicted from the (rented) land may curb the incentive to exert a high level of effort. 
 
7 Female-headed households are a rising category of households both in the developing and developed world 
(Chant, 2003). Female-headed households with stronger legal or customary decision making power (such as 
divorced or widowed) are considered de jure, while those who lack such power (with an out-migrated husband) 
are considered de facto (Kennedy and Peters, 1992). As of 2011, the proportion of female-headed households in 
Ethiopia was estimated to be 26.10 percent compared to the examples of Haiti (40.6 percent), Zimbabwe (44.6 
percent) and Malawi (28.1 percent) (World Bank, 2011). The female-headed household group itself is 
heterogeneous, consisting of women who are never-married, divorced, and widowed, and those whose husbands 
have temporarily out-migrated (Seebens, 2007).  
8EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front) is the ruling political coalition in Ethiopia. 
9 In a male-headed household, decision making concerning crop choice, sale of produce and input use tends to be 
male-dominated (Tiruneh et al., 2001). 
10Kebele is the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia, while woreda is the next largest, formed of a collection of 
kebeles. 
 
12 In addition to the certification at a kebele level, we also have a household level certification measurement that 
identifies which households actually received certification in each kebele. The advantage of having a kebele as a 
unit of analysis is that, as the majority of households received certificates in the certified villages, spillover effects 
are likely. In addition, the households that did not receive certificates were mainly excluded for temporary reasons 
such as shortage of papers or delays in registering the households to the program. This implies that the group of 
households that did not receive certificates in the certified villages is mainly constituted of households waiting for 
their certificate. However, in villages where a considerable minority of the households are not certified and/or 
these households do not expect with certainty they will be certified (although they were all eventually certified), 
defining the intervention at household level is justified. It should be noted that defining certification at the 
household level might imply that households within the certified villages that did not receive certification may 
not have been part of the process at all, making the household level measure more conservative than the kebele 
level measure. The results from the household level certification are generally comparable with those of the kebele 
level certification, although the latter are slightly less significant. The results for the household level certification 
are available upon request. 
13 A more detailed description of the variables used in the regressions can be found in Appendix A.  
14 Further investigation of our data shows that female-headed households are comprised of widows (49%), 
married (with husband away for a significant period of time, 25%), divorced (19%), separated (4%), and single 
(3%). 
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15 For ease of comparison across the gender categories, the descriptive statistics includes the time period after 
certification. Descriptive statistics for the period before certification show a small gender difference related to 
land conflict: 20 percent of female-headed households and 18 percent of male-headed households had experienced 
land-related conflict. 
16 Fixed rent involves cash rentals, although in some cases it could also cover cash loans. Sharecropping generally 
involves output sharing and in some cases cost-sharing (Bezabih, 2009). The dominance of sharecropping and the 
activeness of land markets are similar to other findings in the highlands of Ethiopia (Teklu and Lemi, 2004; Pender 
and Fafchamps, 2006, Deininger et al., 2008; Holden and Bezabih, 2008).   
17 The choice of experience of loss of land as a factor in the decision to rent out is based on our observation that 
loss of land is almost always an outcome of redistribution through the kebele administration, which decides on 
redistributing land away from a household based on the land area-family size ratio. Further, there are no reasons 
to believe that the redistributions will have skewedness with respect to land fertility, as original land redistributions 
(in 1975) focused on being egalitarian and land allotted to a farm household consisted of fertile, moderately fertile 
and infertile parcels. Similarly, the experience of conflict may not necessarily be associated with land fertility 
(and hence productivity), as adjacent lands leading to border-related conflicts are not necessarily fertile plots. 
18 It should be noted that we do not find a significant relationship between land certificates and the gender of the 
household head when we identify certification on the household level. As discussed in section 4, the household 
level certification is a more conservative estimate compared to the kebele level, as the possible spillover effects 
as well as households that are in the process of receiving certificates are not accounted for. The results for the 
household level certification are available upon request. 
 
19 The estimation results for the plot selection equation and the inverse Mill’s ratio are presented in Appendix D. 
 
21 The propensity score matching method is a semi-parametric approach, which does not require an exclusion 
restriction or a particular specification of the selection equation to construct the counterfactual.  
